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THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE ROME STATUTE
IN AFRICA: POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND SELF-
REFERRALS
ABSTRACT. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) policy and practice of self-
referrals has attracted some degree of academic criticism. This has been due partly
because the procedure itself was, according to some opinions, never quite envisaged
in the original Rome Statute, and partly because the concept of a State self-referral
appears to contradict the Rome Statute objective of the ICC as a Court of com-
plementarity. Following Gabon’s self-referral in 2016, and in view of the recent
termination of the ICC Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examinations in Gabon, this paper
argues that African States’ self-referral practice continues to represent a step back-
wards for African local justice and accountability. The fact that in this particular
situation the necessary threshold was not met is actually not relevant for the argu-
ment put forward in this paper, namely that this practice should now be put under
scrutiny rather than accepting, at face value, a self-referral whenever an (African)
State proposes it. The strengthening of local accountability and the transformation
of the local justice landscape should be considered as the ICC long-term objectives,
and more dialogue (as well as political pressure) should be contemplated in order to
gently coerce States to take on investigations and prosecutions of international
crimes.
I INTRODUCTION
Despite the words of the Preamble (paragraph 6), the Rome Statute
never imposed a legal obligation on States to investigate and prose-
cute international crimes perpetrated in the State’s territory, though it
proclaimed the newly constituted Court as a court of complemen-
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tarity to national criminal jurisdictions.’ The principle of comple-
mentarity instituted by the ICC reiterated the notion that there is no
shield to the prosecution of international crimes and, if States are
unable or unwilling to prosecute, then the ICC can take over the task.
However, the ICC is not a Court of unlimited resources, both human
and financial, and this reality can have an impact on the number of
situations it can effectively investigate. Moreover, the State’s duty to
cooperate, as set out in Part 9 of the Rome Statute, is the greatest
stumbling block to its effectiveness, as prosecutions cannot take place
if the State is unable or unwilling to arrest and surrender the relevant
individuals to the ICC. On this basis, it is contended that the inter-
national criminal justice vision, and its corresponding maxim to end
impunity for international crimes, should be mostly about enabling
the State to become accountable. This was indeed the principle
underlying the concept of positive complementarity’, which effec-
tively encapsulates the catalysing effect of the ICC on national
criminal mechanisms. The ultimate objective is about instilling the
aspiration, at a domestic level, to pursue the rule of law and ending
impunity for international crimes. But it is acknowledged that in
order to achieve this objective a change of domestic policies, prac-
tices, laws and ideology may take some time, and for some States this
transformative process may indeed take longer. And this is why the
ICC fills a very important gap when States are unable or unwilling.
Having said that, the international community, together with the
appropriate ICC organs and officials, must work towards a more
realistic model of positive complementarity, especially in States where
the concepts of international crimes and impunity have not yet
reached a level of political maturity that provokes a domestic trans-
formative process. A typical example of positive complementarity in
action can be seen in the case of Colombia, where the ICC effectively
assisted the country in its effort to investigate and prosecute inter-
national crimes perpetrated in that territory over the past few dec-
ades. But the question is why the same approach could not be
reciprocated with Gabon (or indeed any other self-referral States).
Surely, the fact that Gabon referred itself to the ICC reflects a certain
level of willingness to see the perpetrators of these crimes investigated
and prosecuted, otherwise it would not have opted for this proce-
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dure.1 But what made Gabon unable to investigate and prosecute
crimes perpetrated before and during the August 2016 presidential
elections? And should the objective of positive complementarity be
about enabling the State to become effectively equipped (with
domestic laws, policies and procedures) throughout its membership
to the ICC – from the moment the State ratifies the Rome statute –
rather than waiting for international crimes to be perpetrated and
then finding out that the State is not equipped to carry our investi-
gations and prosecutions?
The Gabon situation is a very familiar one. Following the 2016
disputed Presidential elections, President Bongo appeared to have
been re-elected as president, but Mr Jean Ping, the opposition leader,
declared the election invalid and demanded a recount. Typically,
violence ensued, leading to Gabon’s claim that Mr Ping had engaged
in incitement to genocide, and referred the situation to the ICC
Prosecutor. In the meantime, Mr Ping also submitted evidence of
crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated by Gabon officials (on
behalf of President Bongo) to the ICC Prosecutor. At the same time,
France started an investigation of alleged crimes against humanity in
relation to the treatment of a French national in Gabon at the rele-
vant time,2 and although no information can be found in relation to
the outcome of this investigation, the ICC Prosecutor terminated the
investigation due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 However,
even though the threshold4 needed to begin an investigation was not
met, there may be lessons to be learnt with respect to the promotion
of the principle of complementarity in the context of self-referrals.
The contention here is whether this self-referral practice has be-
come too entrenched within African States and whether the ICC
acceptance of such practice undermines local justice and account-
ability. And the issue that really needs some consideration is not
1 Requête aux fins de renvoi d’une situation par un etat partie aupres de procureur
de la Cour Penale Internationale, Article 14, Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale
Internationale, 20 September 2016, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Referral-
Gabon.pdf (last accessed on 20 April 2020).
2 See http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170702-french-judge-probes-gabon-post-election-vio
lence (last accessed on 20 April 2020).
3 Article 5 Report on the Situation in the Gabonese Republic, 21 September 2018,
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/180921-otp-rep-gabon_ENG.pdf (last
accessed on 17 December 2019), paras. 16–20.
4 According to Article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute, the three elements that make
up the required threshold are gravity of the crimes, the interest of victims and the
interest of justice.
THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE ROME STATUTE IN AFRICA
about the evaluation of the legal basis for the application of the self-
referral policy by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP),5 but more
about how this practice can be reconciled with the objective of pos-
itive complementarity in African States. There has indeed been some
controversy regarding the self-referral practice, which has led to
politized opinions about the choice of situations investigated by the
Court. For example, in reference to the Uganda situation, Schabas,
one of the strongest critics, contends that the self-referral practice is
an invention of the Office of the Prosecutor rather than the result of
creative interpretation of the Rome Statute…’.6 Schabas is also of the
opinion that such procedure was never contemplated in the travaux
préparatoires of the Court,7 a sentiment shared by other prominent
academics. 8 Ambos, in particular, refers to the use of the self-referral
mechanism as an unexpected application of the State referral proce-
dure, and considers the actions of the first ICC prosecutor, Luis
Moreno Ocampo, to actively’ seeking such self-referrals, as ques-
tionable’.9
Robinson, on the other hand, is quite critical of the assumptions
made by a number of academics regarding the legitimacy, or even the
correct interpretation, of the State referral mechanism.10 He swiftly
disposes of the main objections put forward by other academics
regarding the creative interpretation of Article 14 Rome Statute,11 as
well as the claim that the Rome Statute negotiations delegates never
5 See, for example, see A.T. Müller and I. Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial –
From Panacea to Patient’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 1267–
1294.
6 W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute (OUP, 2010) at 309.
7 W. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court’ 6 JICJ (2009) 731–761, at 751.
8 See M.Arsanjani and W.Reisman, Law-in-Action of the International Criminal
Court’ 99 AJIL (2005) 385–403; A.T. Müller and I. Stegmiller (supra note 5); K.
Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law – Volume III: International Criminal
Procedure (OUP, 2016), 256–260.
9 Ibid (Ambos), at 257.
10 D. Robinson, The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections
on ICL Discourse’ 9 JICJ (2011) 355–384.
11 Ibid, at 360.
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intended such procedure to be included.12 This position is also sup-
ported by Nouwen,13 and indeed even the ICC Appeals Chamber
reasoned that the State’s decision to relinquish its jurisdiction in
favour of the Court may well be seen as complying with the ‘‘duty to
exercise [its] criminal jurisdiction’’ as envisaged in the sixth paragraph
of the Preamble’.14
Therefore, although the policy and practice of self-referrals is not
the central issue here, this paper seeks to address a more theoretical
question regarding the ongoing use, and effect, of the self-referral
practice of African States, and whether the ICC can influence this
practice to reinforce the objective of the complementarity regime, or
more specifically the positive complementarity policy, so that States
investigate and prosecute international crimes effectively.
II THE COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME AS ENVISAGED IN
THE ROME STATUTE
In order to make sense of the issue raised in this article about the
practice of self-referrals, it is important to re-visit the complemen-
tarity principle to understand the limited function of the ICC. The
Court is tasked with the prosecution of international crimes only
when States are unable or unwilling. It is, therefore, within the
context of these limitations that the admissibility procedures15 pro-
vide the framework for the Court’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction.
This is at the core of the complementarity regime encapsulated in the
Rome Statute. As mentioned above, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute
Preamble recalls that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.
12 Ibid, at 364. See also P. Kirsch and D. Robinson, Referral by States Parties’, in
A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) 619–625, at 622.
13 S.M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire – the Catalysing Effect of
the International Court in Uganda and Sudan (CUP, 2013) at 89.
14 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12
June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, Appeals Chamber ICC-01/04-01/07-
1497, 25 September 2009, at 85. However, in the same paragraph, the Appeals
Chamber also noted that …acting under relevant provisions…and depending on the
circumstances…[it] may decide not to act upon a State’s relinquishment of juris-
diction in favour of the Court’ (para. 85).
15 Articles 17–19 of the Rome Statute.
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This is not, however, a legal duty as such, in the sense that the State
party, upon ratification of the Rome Statute, is not under an obli-
gation to incorporate its provisions into domestic laws. In itself, this
lack of obligation can be interpreted as a contradiction, both in
relation to the overall context of international criminal justice and the
aims of the Rome Statute. If we examine, for example, the Geneva
Conventions, a clear legal duty is imposed on States, either to pros-
ecute the alleged crimes or to extradite to another State.16 The same
can be said with regard to the Genocide Convention; States have a
clear obligation either to prosecute these acts or let an international
penal court prosecute them, or extradite the perpetrators to another
State.17 Such obligation is also contained in Article 10 of the Draft
Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Humanity.18
Having said that, the Court has expressly stated that the lack of
national legislation concerning the investigation and prosecution of
international crimes would not automatically constitute a justifica-
tion for an admissibility challenge.19 The rationale for this standpoint
is that the Rome Statute does not distinguish between domestic and
international crimes, but only considers the conduct of the accused.20
16 Article 49 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970;
Article 50 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971; Article 129 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 972; Article 146 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 973; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), art. 88, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512; Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict arts. 18–19, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. A-3511.
17 Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 7 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
18 UNGA, International Law Commission, Seventy-first Session, Crimes Against
Humanity, A/CN.4/L.935, 15 May 2019.
19 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Public redacted-Decision on the admissi-
bility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/11-01/
11-344-Red, 31 May 2013, paras. 86–88.
20 Ibid, para. 86; Article 20 (3) Rome Statute. To understand the history behind
the distinction between ordinary and international crimes, and the eventual adoption
of the final provision, see the Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, 1995, GA 50th Session, Supplement No. 22, A/
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And by adopting this wider concept States are afforded discretion with
regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute crimes. In fact,
according to the Case Matrix Network, the ICC Statute does not
specify when – or indeed how – its provisions ought to be implemented.
A margin of discretion is therefore afforded to this end’.21 But more to
the point, the decision to implement the crimes listed underArticle 5 of
the ICC Statute – genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression – remains at the discretion of the State.’22
However, given the clear mandate for States to take on the pri-
mary jurisdiction for international crimes, would one still expect a
clear obligation to incorporate such crimes at the domestic level in
order to enable such primary jurisdiction effectively? The Rome
Statute, in fact, only contains a reminder of this duty in the Preamble.
Preambles can set the purpose and context for the interpretation of
the treaty itself 23 but it would be too contentious to claim that
preambles possess any legally binding authority.24 Therefore State
parties are not under any obligations to implement the Rome Statute
in order to exercise their jurisdiction, though it has been argued that
the domestic implementation of the Statute actually reinforces com-
plementarity. For example, according to the Case Matrix Network
the domestic implementation of the Rome Statute is …the first step
towards applying complementarity…and bringing the primacy of
national courts closer’.25 It further asserts that …in order for a State
to be able to investigate or prosecute crimes under its jurisdiction, it is
highly advisable that States adequately incorporate core international
Footnote 20 continued
50/22, paras. 43, 179, at https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b50da8/pdf/ (last accessed
on 17 December 2019); Yearbook of the International Law Commission, ‘‘Report of
the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’’, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2
May-22 July 1994, A/49/10, draft article 42(2), at 117.
21 Centre for International Law Research and Policy, Case Matrix Network,
Implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Ratification,
Implementation, Cooperation, September 2017, para. 3.2, at https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/e05157/pdf/ (last accessed on 17 December 2019) (henceforth Implementing
the Rome Statute’).
22 Ibid, para. 4, at 21.
23 Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1969).
24 See M.H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation’ 164 University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review (2016) 1281–1343.
25 Implementing the Rome Statute (supra note 21), para. 3.2.
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crimes into their national legal systems’.26 A number of commenta-
tors support the view that domestic implementation is in fact a nec-
essary step in order to ensure the primacy of the State over any
investigations and prosecutions, thus fulfilling their duty under the
Preamble,27 a view shared by Amnesty International:
In most cases, a State party to the Rome Statute will have to enact imple-
menting legislation in order to fulfil its obligations under this treaty. In
accordance with the principle of complementarity incorporated in the Rome
Statute, such implementing legislation offers States an excellent opportunity to
enable their prosecutors and courts to fulfil their primary role in ensuring
accountability for [international crimes]…Effective implementing legislation
will demonstrate that the State is aware of its primary responsibility under
international law to ensure accountability for these crimes and will make
certain that national courts, not the Court, will undertake these tasks.28
According to Robinson, domestic implementation has an intrinsic
value’ as it forces States to strengthen their legislative capacity to
prosecute’ international crimes.29 However, he also points out that
there has been an ongoing misinterpretation of Article 17 of the
Rome Statute admissibility procedure because commentators have
failed to notice that this is a two-stage test rather than simply stating
that if a State is unable or unwilling the case becomes admissible.30
Robinson himself declares that such confusion is puzzling’ and has
led to the development of a slogan’ concept of complementarity,
which in turn has prompted a negative stance towards the Court
26 Implementing the Rome Statute (supra note 21), para. 4.
27 See J.K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementa-
tion of Substantive International Criminal Law’ 1 (2003) Journal of International
Criminal Justice 86–113, at 87; K.L. Doherty and T.L.H. McCormack, Comple-
mentarity as a Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation’ 5 (1999) UC
Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 147, at 152; S.M. Meisenberg,
Complying with Complementarity? The Cambodian Implementation of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court’ 5 Asian Journal of International Law
(2015) at 123–142.
28 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court – Updated checklist for
Effective Implementation’, May 2010, at 4–5, at https://www.amnesty.org/down
load/Documents/40000/ior530092010en.pdf (last accessed on 17 December 2019).
29 D. Robinson, The Rome Statute and its Impact on National Law’ in A.
Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP, 2002) at 2.
30 D. Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ 21 Crimi-
nal Law Forum (2010) 67–102.
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because it is seen as applying a different interpretation to the
admissibility criteria set out in the Statute.31 What is more surprising,
given the importance of this mechanism, is the fact that prominent
academics seem to have adopted this incorrect interpretation32 and,
on one occasion, even the ICC Trial Chamber.33 While the reasons
for such mis-interpretation are not very clear, Robinson admits that
failure to clarify the mechanism has led to more distrust towards the
Court and its legitimacy.34
However, what is undeniably certain is that the only legal obli-
gation imposed on States is to cooperate with the Court.35 It follows
that all we are left with is a moral obligation to perform this duty’ –
to investigate and prosecute – which has been captured in the first
ICC Prosecutor’s policy paper:
The system of complementarity is principally based on the recognition that the
exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is not only a right but also a duty of
States. Indeed, the principle underlying the concept of complementarity is that
States remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting
crimes committed under their jurisdiction and that national systems are ex-
pected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards.36
The recognition that the national criminal jurisdiction is a funda-
mental duty of the State is clearly connected to the traditional
Westphalian model of State sovereignty, whereby the exercise of such
jurisdiction rests on the State/Government authorities. Therefore, it
is inherent to the function and nature of the sovereign State that
investigations and prosecutions are carried out as part of the State’s
duty. It is, however, paradoxical that it is generally the State or
government officials, or individuals exercising control over the State
31 Ibid, at 68.
32 See M. Arsanjani and W. M. Reisman, The Law-In-Action of the International
Criminal Court’ 99 AJIL (2005) 385 at 390; W. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v.
Judicial Activism’’ 6 JICJ (2008) 731.
33 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Reasons for the
Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of
the Statute), Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-01/07-1213-tENG, 18 June 2009, para. 74.
34 Robinson (supra note 29), at 14.
35 Part IX Rome Statute.
36 ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,
September 2003, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (last accessed on 17 December
2019), at 5.
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organs (or the State territory), who tend to be the perpetrators of
these despicable crimes. On this basis, it is therefore difficult to rec-
oncile the declaration in paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute Preamble,
or the OTP policy, with the contextual reality of international crimes.
Perhaps, this is more about what the practice ought to be rather than
what it is,37 a concept that is closely associated with the interpretation
of sovereignty38 and with the ongoing transformative process of the
principle of sovereignty to bring it in line with the modern setting of
the human rights discourse. This is, however, an issue to be discussed
elsewhere, and whatever incongruities exist within the existing reali-
ties and constraints of the international criminal law machinery, the
analysis must start with the provisions set out in the Rome Statute.
The discussion begins with an analysis of Article 17, whereby the
ICC will investigate and prosecute international crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.39 According to this procedure, a case is
admissible when the State is either unable or genuinely unwilling to
investigate or prosecute the crime.40 If a State has carried out (or is
carrying out) genuine prosecutions, then the Court is barred from
starting its own investigations and prosecutions, making the case
inadmissible and thus confirming the primacy of the State in the
prosecution of international crimes. The reach of the court was fur-
ther clarified in the Katanga case:41
1. Under article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the question of
unwillingness or inability has to be considered only (1) when
there are, at the time of the proceedings in respect of an admis-
sibility challenge, domestic investigations or prosecutions that
could render the case inadmissible before the Court, or (2) when
there have been such investigations and the State having juris-
diction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.
2. Inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the
fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not
37 R. Summers, ‘‘Is’’ and ‘‘Ought’’ in Legal Philosophy’ (1963) Cornell Law
Faculty Publications, Paper 1129.
38 L.L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ 71
Harvard Law Review (1958) 630–672.
39 Article 5 Rome Statute.
40 Article 17(a) Rome Statute.
41 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Appeal against Mr
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on
the Admissibility of the Case, Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25
September 2009.
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done so) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to
article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute.42Furthermore, the admissibility
procedure should be applied in conjunction with Article 20 (3) of
the Rome Statute, which reaffirms the ne bis in idem principle,
according to which the Court cannot try an individual who has
already been tried by a national court for the same conduct, thus
setting out the two necessary limbs of an admissible case: same
individual and same conduct. This is further re-affirmed in Article
17 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute. The test has been applied in a
variety of judicial decisions, though in the Ruto Admissibility
Judgment the phrase substantially the same conduct’ was adop-
ted,43 a formulation criticized for its lack of clear legal origin and
analysis,44 though Rastan concludes that substantially denotes
the degree of variation that is permissible where the conduct in
two cases is not identical’.45 The same conduct also appears to
require or include specific incidents, where one or more crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have been commit-
ted’,46 or same facts, which must be understood as ‘‘criminal acts
that occur in a particular location and at a specific time and in the
framework of a course of conduct and series of events’’’.47 A slight
deviation to this interpretation was adopted in the Gaddafi
Admissibility Decision, where pre-Trial Chamber I widened the
42 Ibid, paras. 1–2.
43 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto et al, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic
of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled
‘‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’’ (henceforth
Ruto Admissibility Judgment), Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August
2011, para. 40.
44 See, for example, C. Stahn, Admissibility Challenges before the ICC from
Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference?’ in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of
the International Criminal Court (OUP, 2015), at 242.
45 R. Rastan, What is Substantially the Same Conduct’? Unpacking the ICC’s
First Limb’ Complementarity Jurisprudence’ 15 JICJ (2017), 1–29, at 11.
46 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS-1, VPRS-2, VPRS-3, VPRS-4, VPRS-5,
VPRS-6, (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2006, para.
65.
47 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi And Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/
11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013 (henceforth Al Senussi Admissibility Decision),
para. 47.
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scope of specific incidents’, noting that the events did not rep-
resent unique manifestations of the forms of criminality alleged
against Mr Gaddafi’ but rather samples of a course of conduct’.48
However, the Appeals Chamber rejected such interpretation and
re-affirmed the necessity to refer to the specific conduct of the
defendant, noting that the ‘‘conduct’’ that defines the ‘‘case’’ is
both that of the suspect, Mr Gaddafi, and that described in the
incidents under investigation which is imputed to the suspect’.49
In light of such level of specificity with regard to the interpretation
and application of the admissibility criteria, the State’s ability to
actually investigate and prosecute international crimes may become
more restricted and, at the same time, may widen the ICC comple-
mentary nature. Nouwen puts this quite plainly, stating that
…the same conduct test, and particularly the same-incident test, makes it
practically impossible for a State to win on grounds of complementarity when
faced with an ICC Prosecutor determined to be or stay involved: the domestic
analogy fails to recognise the different context in which international crimes
are typically committed.50
There is also further ambiguity about the interpretation of the gen-
uineness of any proceedings undertaken (or to be undertaken) by the
State, especially as the traveaux préparatoires are generally silent on
this issue.51 Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that during the Rome
Statute negotiations delegates did not choose to set some specific
parameters to the word genuine, as contained in Article 17 of the
Rome Statute. However, this is not surprising, as the adoption of the
word genuine was in itself problematic and, as the delegates could not
easily find agreement, eventually opted for the least objectionable
word’ – genuine – after rejecting words/phrases, such as apparently
48 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Public Redacted-Decision on the admissi-
bility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 31 May 2013 (henceforth Gaddafi Admissibility Decision), para. 82.
49 Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of
31 May 2013 entitled ‘‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi’’, Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Red, 21 May 2014 (henceforth
Gaddafi Admissibility Judgment), para. 62.
50 Nouwen (supra note 13), at 55.
51 M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law:
Origins, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), at 164.
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well-founded’, effectively’, ineffective’, good faith’, diligently’ and
sufficient grounds’.52 In accordance with the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,53 genuine must be interpreted on the basis of its
ordinary meaning, and one such meaning is freedom from hypocrisy
and pretence - sincere’.54 For example, if we look at the Colombia
situation, the punishment dispensed by the domestic courts is a rea-
sonable indicator that the proceedings are genuine, as well as the lack
of unjustified delays and the certainty that national proceedings are
not aimed at shielding a defendant.55 However, in the context of
punishment, and specifically considering the domestic social and
political contexts, there can be many subtle variations, and there is
therefore room (and indeed a need) for the development of a clear
framework for genuine proceedings in order to promote positive
complementarity.56
Therefore, whilst it is the Court that determines whether a case is
admissible or not,57 the narrow contours of the same conduct
requirements and the lack of clear parameters applicable to the
genuiness of proceedings may jeopardise the objective of comple-
mentarity. And this is especially the case when we consider the self-
referral practice. Instinctively, as it is States (or rather their officials)
that perpetrate these crimes, one could argue that it is in fact better
for the ICC to define the contours of complementarity in order to
achieve more effective justice. But what is the role of the State? In its
simplest form, the Rome Statute creates the first ever International
52 J. T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity’, in The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) 41, at 49.
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
54 Genuine, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016).
55 OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor on the Agreement on the Creation of a Special
Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 24, 2015), at https://
www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160901-otp-stat-colombia (last accessed on
20 April 2020).
56 See M. Aksenova, Values on the Move: The Colombian Sentencing Practice
and the Principle of Complementarity under the Rome Statute’, iCourts Working
Paper Series, No. 24, 2015; L.R. Guzman & B. Holá, Punishment in Negotiated
Transitions: The Case of the Colombian Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP’ 19
International Criminal Law Review (2019) 127–159.
57 Article 19 (1) Rome Statute; see also The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent
Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the admissibility of the case
under article 19(1) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-377, 11
March 2009, para. 45.
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Criminal Court and sets out the Court’s procedures to make it
operationally effective, including the cooperation procedure between
member States and the Court. In other words, the creation of the
Court does not change anything at the domestic level; it is not
transformative, despite the high expectations envisaged at the time of
its creation. In fact, at the domestic level, governments or government
officials can still choose to do what they want: they can legislate and
demonstrate genuine intentions to investigate and prosecute inter-
national crimes, not just to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court but
also to endorse and reinforce a human rights-centric model of so-
vereignty. On the other hand, States can continue to perpetrate
international crimes against their citizens, which may ultimately re-
sult in sham prosecutions or no prosecutions at all. In this context,
the surrendering of the perpetrators to the ICC may be problematic,
and they could still be allowed to hold prominent positions in gov-
ernment. They can also travel around friendly States58 without
incurring the risk of being arrested and surrendered to the Court. It
may indeed become a waiting game for the ICC Prosecutor, waiting
for a change of government,59 or waiting for a previously friendly
State to start cooperating with the Court. In essence, however,
nothing much has changed. States (though not all of them) remain, as
ever, interested in protecting and affirming their sovereignty status,60
whereas the ICC is a Court setup with the mandate to prosecute
international crimes – to complement States’ traditional jurisdiction –
and end the culture of impunity.
58 This is a reference to States (members States to the Rome Statute or not), which
are unlikely to arrest and surrender individuals to the ICC.
59 At the time of writing, a coup d’état in Sudan has led to the fall of President Al
Bashir, leading to a more realistic prospect that he may be arrested and surrendered
to the ICC; see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47961424 (last accessed on
10 December 2019).
60 This claim should be interpreted, of course, in the light of multiple variants of
State sovereignty, depending above all on the State’s political ideology and its
relationship with the human rights ideology. It can be argued that the further the
State distances itself from human rights, the more protective it is of its own sover-
eignty, though even this framework may be subject to further conjecture with regard
to States’ interests; see F. Mégret, The politics of international Criminal Justice’ 13
EJIL (2002) 1261–1284.
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III POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM POLICY TO
DYNAMIC IMPLEMENTATION?
If we think of complementarity as a process of norm internaliza-
tion’,61 then all member States should, in theory, be empowered to
participate equally and achieve a similar level of norm internalization
in order to establish coherent and effective domestic implementations
of international criminal law. The prevailing, shared and agreed
meaning of complementarity is that primary responsibility for the
investigation and prosecution of international crimes rests with the
State; therefore …their capacity to do so should be strengthened.’62
This notion may be interpreted as the need for a structured and
methodological approach to examine the specific circumstances of the
State and provide appropriate assistance for that State to meet its
demands under international law. The idea that all States are equal is
not the same as the notion that all States are sufficiently developed
and evolved to meet the standards and demands of international
criminal justice. This is even more so in the case of States that,
through the principle of self-determination, have acquired indepen-
dent sovereign status. States emerging from long periods of European
governance have had to conform to the State’s model created by
international law, a model that is heavily influenced by the European
tradition, and could potentially clash with local cultures and cus-
toms.63 Moreover, a number of States still hold on quite tightly to a
classical conception of sovereignty, where any notion of interference
in the internal affairs of their own State is practically inconceivable,
even if the nature of the interference is to protect fundamental human
rights.
As the traditional Westphalian concept of State sovereignty has
for far too long been used as a shield to protect alleged perpetrators
of international crimes, it is vital not to continue this perverse ide-
ology. However, the international criminal justice mechanism estab-
lished by the Rome Statute should aim at enabling all States to
achieve the status of being able and willing’. It is acknowledged from
the previous discussion that this may not have been the original
61 J.K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal
Jurisdictions (OUP, 2008) 332–339.
62 Ibid, 333.
63 For a discussion on the experience of some specific African States, see N.L.
Wallace-Bruce, Of Collapsed, Dysfunctional and Disoriented States: Challenges to
International Law’, 47 Netherlands International Law Review (2000) 53–73.
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objective of the Rome Statute, but the quest for the fight against
impunity would benefit exponentially if more States were able to
investigate and prosecute such crimes.
In addition, the principle of sovereign equality established in the
UN Charter allows States to acquire a specific set of juridical rights.
At the time, the principal aim was the establishment of the juridical
principle of sovereign equality. It was the conviction that all States
should be able to participate in international law making, either
multilaterally or bilaterally, and that no State should interfere in the
internal affairs of other States. Nevertheless, the objective of the
principle of sovereignty should also be to promote a fair and just
international community.64 In other words, it is not just the inter-
national community, as an entity, that should be capable of offering
optimal conditions to achieve stability and social well-being, neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among States,65 but also for
each State to achieve stability and well-being within its own territory.
Cristina Pellandini, head of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) Advisory Service on international humanitarian law,
has long recognised the importance of national committees in order
to effectively realise the political will to adhere to international
humanitarian law at domestic level:
Pushing forward the enactment of such legislation requires close cooperation
between many different entities, both within the government and civil society.
National committees for the implementation of international humanitarian
law, because they are inter-ministerial or inter-institutional working groups,
bringing together various national agencies with responsibilities in the field of
international humanitarian law, have proved to be a very useful mechanism.
Their main purpose is to advise and assist the government in implementing and
spreading knowledge of international humanitarian law.66
On this point, the ICRC does enable States to set up such national
committees and provides ongoing support.67 And notwithstanding
64 See T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP, 1998).
65 Article 55 U.N. Charter.
66 C. Pellandini, Ensuring national compliance with IHL: The role and impact of
national IHL committees’ 96 International Review of the Red Cross (895/896)
December 2015, 1043–1058.
67 ICRC, Preventing and Repressing International Crimes: Towards an ‘‘Inte-
grated’’ Approach Based in Domestic Practice, report of the Third Universal
Meeting of National Committees for the Implementation of International Human-
itarian Law (Volume 1, 2014).
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the fact that the ICRC is a completely different entity from the ICC,
there are clear common objectives. Therefore, the ICRC does not
exclude the possibility that the activities of such national committees
could extend to the implementation of other treaties’ obligations,
such as the ones that arise from the Rome Statute.68 And this in turn
would embed a culture of prevention and prosecution of international
crimes at the domestic level. If the ICC is serious regarding the
principle of complementarity, then a more dynamic model could be
put in place to raise awareness of the duty to investigate and prose-
cute, enabling States to internalize international criminal law effec-
tively, but remaining sensitive to the principles of State sovereignty
and non-intervention. This approach to complementarity is proac-
tive,69 in the sense that it positively encourages national jurisdictions
to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Back in 2004 the
ICC Prosecutor supported the concept of proactive or positive com-
plementarity and clarified that one of the ICC strategies was in fact
that rather than competing with national systems for jurisdiction, we
will encourage national proceedings wherever possible.’70
This is therefore not just about putting the necessary legislation in
place to enable States to investigate and prosecute, but also to
encourage States to do so, a policy confirmed by the 2009–2012
Prosecutorial Strategy. This model would also help to dismiss feelings
of distrust towards the International Criminal Court, especially in the
African continent, which has attracted most ICC prosecutions to
date.71 Also, the ICC outreach programme, which normally takes
68 ICRC, National Committees and Similar Entities on International Humani-
tarian Law: Guidelines for Success – towards Respecting and Implementing Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (2019).
69 W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’, 49Harvard
International Law Journal (2008) 53–108.
70 Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps (The
Hague, 12 February 2004), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0F999F00-
A609-4516-A91A-80467BC432D3/143670/LOM_20040212_En.pdf (last accessed on
18 December 2019).
71 In this respect, the African Union (AU) has been a strong critic of the Court in
recent years, especially regarding the question of immunity of Heads of States. This
led to a call to the African Group in New York to place a request on the agenda of
the United Nations General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice about the immunity of sitting Heads of States and other
Senior Officials; see Assembly of the Union, 30th Ordinary Session, Decision on the
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.672 (XXX), 5(ii) (28–29 January
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place in post-conflict areas, aims at educating and empowering the
victims of human rights violations. The aim of the Programme is to
disseminate knowledge and understanding of the ICC and its judicial
activities amongst a variety of audiences in order to increase victims’
awareness of the procedures and investigations that need to take
place to bring perpetrators to justice. Together with a strategy of
External Relations and Public Information, it aims at communicating
actively with the relevant communities in order to build support and
maintain a high level of cooperation. This programme could, in ef-
fect, lead to a catalysing effect of the Rome Statute, and its related
ICC activities, into the domestic educational, legislative and judiciary
processes, and the work of the Registry also contributes to this
development at the local level.
However, in order to meet the objective of positive complemen-
tarity, this programme could be extended to situations where there is
a history of political unrest or in transitional societies, rather than
waiting for an event (an international crime) to occur on the territory
of such State and then for the ICC to start its investigations and
prosecutions because the State is not equipped to do so. But having
the correct legislative and judiciary process in place is not synony-
mous with the ability and willingness to genuinely investigate and
prosecute. The aim is to better equip the lawyers, the judiciary, and
government officials and to instil concepts of justice and the rule of
law in order to deal with impunity for international crimes at the
domestic level. Moreover, given that the ICC can only deal with the
most serious offenders, other perpetrators could potentially escape
criminal liability if the State does not have the adequate domestic
laws to investigate and prosecute them.72 In this case, the ICC OTP,
whilst carrying out their own investigations in a State where viola-
tions have taken place, could offer assistance to the local judges and
lawyers to enable them to prosecute other perpetrators.73 This pro-
cess should be carried out with sensitivity towards the local customs
and working practices, and should lead to a stronger dialogue with
Footnote 71 continued
2018), available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/33908-assembly_deci
sions_665_-_689_e.pdf (last accessed on 20 April 2020).
72 Waddel and Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict: Justice, Peace and the ICC in
Africa, at 55.
73 The OTP has clearly offered its support to help Uganda in its first prosecution
of an LRA commander, Mr Kwoyelo but, as the discussion below will show, it has
not proven to be very effective (see infra p. 36).
PATRICIA HOBBS
local human rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
civil agencies in order to gain trust and dispel any doubts or perceived
concerns of neo-colonialism.74 Such criticism has been quite pre-
dominant in some African States. The indictment of Sudan’s Presi-
dent Al Bashir led the Sudanese government to declare that the ICC
itself was a mechanism which perpetuated colonial dominance, …a
tool for those who believe that they have a monopoly on virtues in
this world, rife with injustice and tyranny.’75 In Kenya, on the other
hand, the neo-colonial narrative was used as a weapon against
cooperation.76 However, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) situation demonstrated, it would be presumptuous to assume
that all States would be against closer collaboration with outside
agencies and OTP officials in order to improve their domestic situa-
tions (including impunity and deterrence). Moreover, this approach
supports the development of a dialogue at the national level, thus
enabling the processes that are needed to rethink the State’s rela-
tionship to its citizens at the local level. Having said that, and despite
the rhetoric of positive complementarity at the time, cooperation only
took place in one direction.77 Indeed, the Rome Statute does provide
for the Court’s cooperation and assistance towards an investigating
State, though the language here changes from shall to may, denoting
discretion rather than obligation.78
Proactive complementarity also supports the emerging doctrine of
earned sovereignty, an approach that aims to resolve …sovereignty-
based conflicts by providing for the managed devolution of sovereign
authority and functions from a State to a sub-State entity.’79 This
approach rests on the notion that the traditional principle of State
74 See K. Ambos, Expanding the focus of the African Criminal Court’, in W. A.
Schabas, Y. McDermott and N. Hayes (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to
International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013), 499–529; J. J.
Vilmer, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: counteracting the
crisis’ 92 International Affairs 6 (2016) 1319–1342.
75 R. Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’ 19
Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), 195–222, at 219
76 G. Lugano, Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention
as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya’, 11 International Journal of Transitional Justice
1 (2017) 9–29.
77 Waddel and Clark (eds.) (supra note 72), at 58.
78 Article 93 (10) Rome Statute.
79 P.R. Williams and F.J. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between
Sovereignty and Self-Determination’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 40
(2004), 347–386, at 354.
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sovereignty (or the acquisition of sovereignty through self-determi-
nation for many former colonies) may not provide the best basis to
enable the concerned State to exercise its sovereign powers in keeping
with a more contemporary understanding of sovereignty. According
to this modern understanding of sovereignty, the development of
domestic legislative procedures and judicial processes will be more in
line with current conceptions of human rights protection and effective
punishment for international crimes. This can be achieved through
closer collaboration between the State, the OTP and NGOs. The
development of internal legal structures to enable the State to carry
out investigations and prosecutions of international crimes could
occur through a joint effort, thus fulfilling the State’s primary juris-
diction mandate.
Bassiouni recognised the need to make national prosecutions of
international crimes a reality. In a speech at an international law
conference in Washington D.C. in 2010 he expressed doubts about
the success of international criminal tribunals and the International
Criminal Court. In particular, he recognised that the ICC will not be
able to meet the expectation of the international community, mainly
because of the ‘‘exorbitant’’ economic and administration infras-
tructure, citing 1,100 staff, a budget of $145 million (2010 only) and
only four cases in 7 years since it started operating.80 He concluded
that the responsibility for the prosecution of international crimes
would be taken up by the States.81 At the same time, one of the key
points that emerged from the ICC Review conference was the reali-
sation that national jurisdictions needed to be strengthened. To this
end a new resolution on complementarity was adopted, which, inter
alia, reaffirmed that effective prosecutions for international crimes
could be ensured by taking measures at national level, and encour-
aged the Court, State parties, international organisations and civil
society to explore ways to enhance the capacity of national jurisdic-
tions to prosecute international crimes.82
80 A summary and critique of this speech can be found at: http://www.in
sidejustice.com/intl/2010/03/31/cherif_bassiouni_international_criminal/ (last ac
cessed on 10 December 2019).
81 Ibid.
82 ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the
Assembly of States Parties, ICC Review Conference, Kampala, 31 May to 11 June
2010, at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-9-Res.3-
ENG.pdf (last accessed on 17 December 2019).
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Given the perceived dynamic and evolving nature of positive
complementarity, and the seemingly developing policy that more
needs to be done to enable States to prosecute international crimes, in
practice – and specifically in the context of achieving positive com-
plementarity in Africa – the policy does not appear to have been very
effective. Schabas puts this quite succinctly when he remarks on the
situations been prosecuted by the ICC and whether the gravity ele-
ment83 is indeed been examined properly:
The first six ‘‘situations’’ investigated by the Prosecutor concern geographically
contiguous countries in central Africa: Uganda, Sudan, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and Libya. Is it really
conceivable that an objective application of the gravity criterion, as proposed
in materials from the Office of the Prosecutor, leads inexorably to this result? Is
this simply a coincidence? There must surely be a strong presumption that
some sort of policy determination is involved, absent any convincing expla-
nation to the contrary.84
As Schabas made these remarks back in 2012, Mali (a self-referral
situation) and Côte d’Ivoire (a proprio motu situation) should be
added to the existing list of African States where the ICC is carrying
out investigations and prosecutions. A predominant focus on Africa
continued until January 2016 when the Court authorised the start of
proprio motu investigations in the Republic of Georgia.85
In in the midst of this background, we do have a case in point with
regard to positive complementarity, namely Colombia. What is
important to note here is that, unlike Gabon, Colombia did not refer
itself to the ICC, and what appears to have been extremely beneficial
for Colombia was the OTP opening of a preliminary examination in
its situation. This is clearly insufficient in itself to claim that there is a
direct link between the opening of a preliminary examination and the
State’s resolution to start domestic proceedings in order to avoid the
Court’s jurisdiction.86 Academics and practitioners are divided about
83 Article 17 (1)(d).
84 W. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War
Crimes Tribunals (OUP, 2012) at 88–89.
85 Situation in Georgia, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
request for authorization of an investigation, ICC-01/15-12, 27 January 2016. |
86 This method was in fact not effective I the case of Kenya; see C. Björk and J.
Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Development’ 4 Law
Journal (2011) 205–230.
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its effectiveness,87 but it may be a more effective tool to use rather
than allowing the practice of self-referrals, as discussed below.
Colombia was affected by internal violent struggles between gov-
ernment and paramilitary forces88 for about fifty years, causing
widespread killings and serious human rights violations, war crimes
and crimes against humanity.89 However, Álvaro Uribe’s election as
President in 2002 was followed by a successful campaign against the
paramilitary groups and marked the start of the transitional justice
process. In 2002 Colombia ratified the Rome Statute, adding a dec-
laration under Article 124 that it would not accept the jurisdiction of
the Court for seven years with regard to war crimes. Although
Colombia started to take some steps towards the investigations and
prosecutions of the crimes alleged to have been perpetrated in the
country,90 the ICC, having received communications about the situ-
ation, decided to start a preliminary examination of the Colombia
situation in 2006, in line with Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute.91
This initial OTP interest in the Colombian situation was followed
by the country’s credible attempts to conduct their own investigations
and prosecutions, which in turn led the ICC to carefully scrutinise the
legislative changes introduced by Colombia. This was followed by
years of discussion and interaction between the OTP and Colombia,
as well as an evaluation into whether Colombia was (and is) doing
87 M. Bergsmo and C. Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination
(Volume 1, 2018, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher Brussels), 402–407.
88 Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces-Popular Army and the National
Liberation Army; FARC and ELN respectively henceforth.
89 See Human Rights Watch Report On their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army
Officers’ Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia’, 24 January 2015, at
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-senior-army-officers-re
sponsibility-false-positive-killings (accessed on 21 March 2018).
90 For example, Law no. 975 of 2005 (hereafter Justice and Peace Law); Law No.
1424 of 2010 and the Legislative Act No. 01 of 2012 (Legal Framework for Peace).
For an in depth analysis of these legislative provisions see H. Olasolo and J.M.F.
Ramirez Mendoza, The Colombian Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation
and Non-Repetition’ 15 JICJ (2017) 1011–1047.
91 See OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 13 December 2011, at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C13-
F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPReportonPreliminaryExaminations13December2011.
pdf (last accessed on 18 December 2019).
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enough to secure the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators.92 This
led to the Deputy ICC Prosecutor, James Stewart, to declare that
Colombia, as a State Party to the Rome Statute, has engaged with
the Prosecutor in a positive approach to complementarity’.93
This level of optimism did have some shortcomings. The sentences
set out by the Justice and Peace Law of 2005 ranged from five to eight
years. These were indeed very short sentences given the gravity of the
crimes committed, but the objective of this particular law was to
bring justice and reparations; therefore, the short sentences were to be
accompanied by truth telling, reparations to the victims and a pro-
mise not to return to unlawful behaviour.94 Unsurprisingly, criticism
of these lenient sentences ensued.95 When the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court was asked to rule on the merits of the Law, it did not
comment on the apparent (and much criticised) by-product of this
Law, namely that it introduced a system of veiled pardon and cov-
ered up impunity’, stating rather that the Law tried to achieve a
balance between peace and justice.96 In the context of the argument
set out in this paper, the Colombia situation provides the first and
only example of positive complementarity. It is, however, not without
criticism and there are doubts about its authenticity,97 but the ICC
continues to keep a watchful eye on the situation.
92 See OTP Interim Report on Colombia (2012) (at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIA
PublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf, last accessed on 18 December 2019) and
the Reports on Preliminary Examination Activities since 2013, at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/colombia (last accessed on 18 December 2019).
93 ‘‘Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of the International Criminal
Court’’, conference held in Bogota on 13 May 2015, keynote speech by James Ste-
wart, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.as
px?name=otp-stat-13-05-2015 (last accessed on 17 December 2019).
94 See, in particular, Articles 1 and 29 of the Justice and Peace Law.
95 See, for example, the New York Times Editorial opinion, at https://www.ny
times.com/2005/07/06/opinion/colombias-capitulation.html (last accessed on 20
April 2020).
96 Gustavo Gallón Giraldo y Otros v. Colombia, Corte Constitucional de Colombia,
Sentencia No. C-370/2006; see also R. Jeffery, Amnesties, Accountability and Human
Rights (Penn, Philadelphia, 2014).
97 See J.S, Easterday, Deciding The Fate Of Complementarity: A Colombian
Case Study’ 26 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law (2009), 49-111;
K. Ambos, The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the
International Criminal Court: An Inductive, Situation-based Approach (Springer, New
York, 2010); M. Kersten, Peace with Justice in Colombia: Why the ICC isn’t the
Guarantor?’, Blog: Justice in Conflict, 6 October 2016, available online at https://
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In the Libya situation, on the other hand, the ICC found the case
inadmissible in relation to Abdullah Al-Senussi, the Head of Libya’s
Military Intelligence,98 though admissibility was upheld in the case of
Saif Gaddafi, Libya’s de facto prime minister.99 In both cases there
were some procedural issues. Libya found it difficult to appoint de-
fence lawyers but at least Al-Senussi was in Libya’s custody, whereas
Gaddafi was not, partly due to the fact that Libya may not have been
in effective control of the prison where he was held. Despite Libya’s
on-going efforts to secure Mr Gaddafi’s transfer to Tripoli, to secure
witnesses and to appoint a suitable defence counsel, the Chamber
reasoned that Libya was unable to prosecute Mr Gaddafi, irrespec-
tive of whether it was willing.100 The same potential obstacle existed
in the case of Mr Al-Senussi – the lack of defence counsel – but the
Chamber considered it to be a potential obstacle in the future, but not
one that would have an immediate negative impact on the admissi-
bility of the case.101 There is also the issue mentioned in the discus-
sion above regarding the different interpretations adopted by the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber regarding same conduct’,
which could lead to uncertainty and possibly unpredictable results
regarding the admissibility of a case. Ultimately, however, the Pre-
Trial Chamber decided that the Gaddafi case was admissible because
it could not determine the contours of the case investigated at the
domestic level and therefore Libya had failed to demonstrate that the
case being investigated was the same as the one set out in the Arrest
Warrant.102 It also expressed concerns regarding Libya’s ability to
carry out a genuine investigation and prosecution in relation to
Gaddafi.103 Regarding the Al-Senussi case, on the other hand, it was
found that the case being investigated by Libya was substantially the
Footnote 97 continued
justiceinconflict.org/2016/10/13/peace-with-justice-in-colombia-why-the-icc-isnt-the-
guarantor/ (last accessed on 25 March 2018).
98 Al-Senussi Admissibility Decision (supra note 47).
99 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (supra note 48); Gaddafi Admissibility Judg-
ment (supra note 49); Decision on the Admissibility Challenge by Dr. Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute’, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, ICC-01/11-01/11, 5 April 2019.
100 Ibid, paras. 204–216.
101 Al-Senussi Admissibility Decision (supra note 47), para. 307.
102 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (supra note 48), at 135.
103 Ibid, at 137.
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same conduct’ being investigated by the Court,104 concluding that the
case was therefore inadmissible.
The overwhelming focus on African States, the (so far) successful
story regarding Colombia and its domestic prosecutions, and the
clarification of the admissibility procedures revealed in the Libya
situation lead to question the potential for enhancement of the
criminal justice model, the rule of law at the domestic level, and the
development of a more tangible dynamic concept of positive com-
plementary. Inconsistencies and lack of clarity with regard to the
application of the concept of complementarity can be counter-pro-
ductive for the establishment of a strong domestic model, but this is
mainly the case when the concept of complementarity is interpreted in
a narrow legal sense. For example, according to Phil Clark, com-
plementarity should be viewed as a legal and political tool, which
leads to four overlapping notions’: a legal framework’, a political
conception’, a relational principle’ and a developmental concep-
tion’.105 The model proposed by Clark conceptualises the dynamic
nature of what complementarity ought to be, so that the ICC does
not become overloaded and the burden of (effective) investigations
and prosecutions rests on the State, in accordance with the objective
of the Rome Statute. But this is not the story of complementarity in
Africa, where a near-tradition of self-referrals, accompanied by pro-
prio motu prosecutions and Security Council referrals, have led to the
adoption of a legal framework that does not resemble the dynamic
nature of positive complementarity.106
IV A HISTORY OF SELF-REFERRALS TO THE ICC
If we consider complementarity as a developing and dynamic
mechanism that allows (or possibly enables) States to carry out
effective prosecutions for international crimes, the conundrum now
focuses on the issue of self-referrals. It is submitted that the self-
referral mechanism essentially contradicts positive complementarity
and the spirit of the international criminal justice project. It has al-
ready been argued above that positive complementarity, specifically
in the context of investigations and prosecutions, has so far been
104 Al Senussi Admissibility Decision (supra note 47), at 167.
105 P. Clark, Distant Justice – The Impact of the International Criminal Court on
African Politics (CUP, 2018), at 26.
106 Ibid, at 303.
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successful only in the context of Colombia. The contention at this
stage of the discussion is that positive complementarity and self-re-
ferrals should be evaluated together for the following reasons: first, it
is necessary to determine whether the self-referral mechanism con-
forms to the policy of positive complementarity; secondly, if it does
not, whether it is time to subject this mechanism to a more appro-
priate level of scrutiny to ensure it is in line with positive comple-
mentarity.
In accordance with Articles 13–15 of the Rome Statute, a situation
can be referred to the ICC either by a State party, or by the Security
Council, or by the ICC Prosecutor using proprio motu powers. A
State party referral of a situation to the ICC, as envisaged originally
by the Rome Statute drafters, meant that a State party to the Rome
Statute would be able to refer another State to the ICC. Territorial or
nationality limitations were never envisaged by the Rome Statute
drafters107 and, although potentially political in nature, this kind of
State referral is easily justified on the basis of the gravity of the crimes
and the common interests of all States to see these crimes prosecuted.
However, this type of referral – State to State – has never taken place,
and it may be for this reason that the Rome Statute contains the
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers as another trigger mechanism (as
well as the SC referral), just in case no referrals were forthcoming
from State parties.108
All African situations currently under investigation and prosecu-
tion have been referred to the ICC using all three mechanisms, with
one significant proviso: a State party referral was never intended to
comprise self-referrals. An argument put forward by some com-
mentators is that a self-referral is not a State party referral as
envisaged by the drafters and it denotes an unusual underlying line of
thinking: why would a State complaint about itself? Given the
example above concerning the rogue State, a complaint by another
State is expected, but how does a self-complaint fit within the purpose
and spirit of the Rome Statute? The immediate answer would be that
a self-referral provides the Court with work, and this is in fact how
the Court initially became operational. The then ICC Prosecutor, Mr
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, aware of the fact that the use of proprio motu
107 See M. Klamberg, Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court
(at 177–179); P. Kirsch and D. Robinson, Initiation of Proceedings by the Prose-
cutor’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP, Volume 1, 2002) 619, 622–623.
108 A.T. Müller & I. Stegmiller (supra note 5).
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powers to initiate investigations were not popular, actively invited
voluntary referrals to enhance cooperation between the State and the
Court, leading to the self-referrals by Uganda and the DRC.109
Addressing the Second Assembly to State Parties in 2003, the
Prosecutor, whilst stating that he was about to seek the Pre-Trial
Chamber authorisation to start investigating the DRC situation,
following a number of communications, he also acknowledged that
Our role could be facilitated by a referral or active support from the DRC. The
Court and the territorial State may agree that a consensual division of labour
could be an effective approach. Groups bitterly divided by conflict may oppose
prosecutions at each others’ hands and yet agree to a prosecution by a Court
perceived as neutral and impartial.110
The self-referral mechanism enabled the Court to start its operations
but what prompted Uganda and the DRC to follow this route? Were
they automatically declaring themselves inactive in relation to the
alleged crimes? Were there any advantages for them to follow this
route, especially as it may have been quite likely that the OTP would
have been able to obtain the necessary authorisations from the Pre-
Trial Chamber? Whilst waiting for States to refer the DRC situation,
Uganda delivered the first ever notification to initiate an investigation
into the Uganda situation, indicating that
…the ICC is the most appropriate and effective forum for the investigation and
prosecution of those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes within
the referred situation…the Ugandan authorities have not and do not intend to
conduct national proceedings.111
It is important to set this line of thinking into the right context. This
referral marked the beginning of the ICC operations, and there was
clearly an exchange of interests between the Court and Uganda.
Nouwen refers to this partnership as a marriage of convenience, with
109 ICC OTP, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years
(June 2003–June 2006), 12 September 2006, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_
English.pdf (last accessed on 17 December 2019).
110 ICC Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, 8 September 2003, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C073586C-
7D46-4CBE-B901-0672908E8639/143656/LMO_20030908_En.pdf (last accessed on
17 December 2019).
111 Nouwen (supra note 13), at 111.
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the occasional convergence of interests between the ICC and the
Ugandan authorities, but on other occasions different interests led to
a difficult relationship.112 Difficulties started when Uganda requested
the ICC to deal solely with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), only
to be confronted by ICC officials declaring such request as impossible
because it is the OTP that sets out the scope of the investigations. For
the ICC this marriage promised the convenience of Uganda’s full
cooperation without the need to seek the Pre-Trial Chamber autho-
risation in order to start proceedings. Having said that, any investi-
gations and prosecutions in this situation have so far dealt only with
LRA commanders, with Otti and Kony still at large and Ongwen’s
prosecution only started in 2016. There are, however, two slightly
worrying factors regarding the Uganda situation: first of all, the
underlying motive for the self-referral was Uganda’s inability to ar-
rest the alleged LRA perpetrators, a point clearly stated in the Arrest
Warrants.113 However, if Uganda’s officials could not arrest the al-
leged perpetrators one would wonder how the ICC could possibly
succeed in this task. It cannot! And this leads to the next crucial
point, namely the realisation that an impromptu marriage of conve-
nience, arranged to satisfy certain interests, may have led to an
unintended entrenched practice for the African nations.
But then there is the issue of admissibility, which appears to lack
the appropriate level of scrutiny that would be required in the context
of complementarity. If, as mentioned above, complementarity is
branded as a dynamic principle, then it should be discussed and de-
bated at every stage of the proceedings, and in every case. This should
be done to evaluate the State’s ability and willingness to investigate
and prosecute any given individual at any given time. A correlation of
this argument is that the Court maintains transparency throughout
the proceedings, reminding itself that at all times it remains a Court
complementing the State parties’ jurisdiction and not a Court of
primary jurisdiction. In fact, despite the self-referral, the ICC
admissibility has been disputed. When the Arrest Warrants for Kony
and Ongwen were issued back in 2005, they simply stated that the
112 Ibid, at 116.
113 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph
Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber
II, ICC-02/04-01/05-53, para. 37 (Kony Arrest Warrant); Warrant of Arrest for
Dominic Ongwen, 9 July 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-57, para. 37
(Ongwen Arrest Warrant).
PATRICIA HOBBS
cases appear to be admissible’114 on the basis that Uganda had not
initiated any proceedings yet. The Prosecutor’s observations in 2008
merely confirmed the same fact,115 giving an identical rationale, and
Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed that the admissibility issue was not
in dispute because of the total inaction on the part of the relevant
national authorities’.116 Appealing against the Pre-Trial Chamber
decision on admissibility – because of a lack of proper legal repre-
sentation at the admissibility hearing – it was stated that the decision
would stand and that the lack of legal representation, though a
procedural error, did not affect the substance of the case.117
In fact, Uganda established the International Crimes Division
within the Ugandan domestic courts in 2009, which could be inter-
preted as a catalysing effect of the self-referral to the ICC and a desire
to seek peace in the region. It can be considered as an indicator of the
transformative effect that the self-referral menchanism may have had
on the domestic criminal justice system.118 The reality, however, is
not so ingenuous. The trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, the only LRA
commander tried by the International Crimes Division so far, has
been marred by drama, intrigue and politics’.119 There have been
several attempts to hold a Pre-Trial hearing to confirm the charges
for Kwoyelo in the past eighteen months, but for a variety of reasons
the charges remain unconfirmed and the case remains at the Pre-Trial
stage. It is difficult to evaluate at this stage whether the Ugandan
114 Ibid (Kony Arrest Warrant), para. 38.
115 Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Prosecution’s Observations regarding the
Admissibility of the Case against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen, OTP ICC-02/04-01/15-141, 18 November 2008.
116 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Decision on the admissibility of
the case under article 19(1) of the Statute’, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-
377, 11 March 2009.
117 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Judgment on the appeal of the
Defence against the ‘‘Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19 (1) of
the Statute’’ of 10 March 2009, Appeals Chamber, ICC-02/04-01/05-408, 16
September 2009.
118 Although the Juba Peace talks held between 2006–2008 between the LRA and
Uganda officials signaled the genesis for the special crimes division; see Human
Rights Watch Report Justice for Serious Crimes before National Courts – Uganda’s
International Crimes Division’ 2012, at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re
ports/uganda0112ForUpload_0.pdf (last accessed on 17 December 2019).
119 A. Macdonald & H. Porter, The Trial of Thomas Kwoyelo: Opportunity or
Spectre? Reflections from the Ground on the First LRA Prosecution’ 86 Africa
(2016) 698–722.
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efforts are genuine, although the Amnesty Act granting amnesty to
any Ugandans involved in acts of war since 1986 may not help this
state of affairs,120 and Kwoyelo’s defence lawyers have already
challenged the trial proceedings on the basis that Kwoyelo should be
granted amnesty, in line with the Amnesty Act of 2000. Unusually,
the OTP has not challenged the genuineness of these proceedings,
despite the fact that they have been going on for ten years, the trial
has not yet started, and the victims in this conflict are still waiting for
justice. Given that the Uganda situation was a self-referral, it would
be a welcome development for such a self-referral to have led to
reinforced domestic procedures in order to prosecute effectively. But
it is clear that the mere establishment of a War Crimes/International
Crimes Division in Uganda is not enough to prepare a State to carry
out effective prosecutions, despite the support offered by the OTP.121
Oola’s account concludes with some stark words:
…the Ugandan government has hidden under the veil of complementarity to
prosecute one side to the conflict, shy away from truth-seeking, deny imme-
diate reparatory measures to victims and avoid acknowledgement of its
responsibility and needed institutional reforms. All of this has contributed to
silencing a majority of the victims of Uganda’s conflicts. The ICC’s interven-
tion, in part, has enabled this one-sided focus.122
At the same time, we can also question why Ongwen was arrested and
surrendered to the ICC, rather than facing the prosecution in
Uganda, given that at the time of his arrest the Uganda International
Crimes Division was (theoretically) operational and, even more to the
point, the main reason for the self-referral was Uganda’s inability to
arrest the perpetrators.
V CONCLUSION
Altogether, there have been five self-referrals by African States
(Uganda, DRC, twice from the Central African Republic, Mali and
Gabon) since the Court became operational. And in every self-re-
ferral case, apart from Gabon, the ICC Prosecutor started an
120 Amnesty Act, Ch. 294, 31 December 2000.
121 S. Oola, In the shadow of Kwoyelo’s trial – The ICC and complementarity in
Uganda’ in C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.) Contested Justice: The Politics
and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015).
122 Ibid, at 169.
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investigation. The fact that Gabon’s self-referral did not end up in the
list of the ICC investigations is not the real issue here. The issue is
why do African States continue this practice, and why the ICC allows
this practice to continue. This is not to suggest, of course, that the
examination of a situation following a self-referral should not be
conducted with the utmost scrutiny of the relevant legal criteria, and
there are times when a self-referral may be the only feasible way
forward in order to achieve justice. But there must always be some
consideration for the development of dynamic complementarity. A
self-referral could become just another excuse for dumping’ a situ-
ation on to the ICC.123 If we want to see dynamic complementarity in
action, then African States, just like any other State in the interna-
tional community, deserve the same opportunity to achieve national
accountability for international crimes and, at the same time,
strengthen their domestic criminal justice systems. In other words, we
should be concerned about the potential catalysing effect of the Rome
Statute within (African) national jurisdictions. The facilitation of this
process should lead to the practice of self-referrals as exceptional and
empower African States to strengthen their domestic processes of
criminal justice and accountability, in line with the vision to end
impunity for international crimes. The issue is not, therefore, about
the ability – financial and human – of African States to conduct
effective investigations and prosecutions. It is about the OTP’s
adoption of a notion of complementarity that goes beyond the strictly
legal framework and adopts a more dynamic model in order to
encourage African States to carry out such prosecutions, through
discussions and even political pressure.124 Lastly, there is also an
overwhelming need for a clear OTP policy about the self-referral
mechanism, its relationship to the principle of proactive/positive
complementarity and the State’s primary duty to investigate. Such
policy should be followed by a clear programme of recommendations
and support in the event – as in the Gabon situation – that the
preliminary examinations do not lead to any investigations and/or
prosecutions by the ICC.
123 See Robinson (supra note 29), at 25.
124 See Robinson (supra note 29), at 27.
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